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Abstract. One of constructionism’s chief pragmatic goals is to facilitate
relationships that have transformative potential. According to Kenneth
Gergen, one important theoretical tool towards that end is relational theory,
the construing of human behavior in terms of dialogic processes. We trace
the meaning of ‘dialogic’ and ‘transformative’ through different con-
structionist traditions and argue that these terms are used in a relatively
narrow sense, as compared to an alternative approach we are suggesting.
Moreover, we propose that the usual narrow construal of these concepts
has the unintended consequence of undermining the central constructionist
goal of facilitating transformative relationships. We present an empirical
example that illustrates (1) how people’s conception of their self as a
collection of social scripts draws their attention to and reinforces the
accretion of scripts; (2) how this accretion can get in the way of trans-
formation; and (3) how a broader conception of a ‘dialogic’ self can open
up more direct, transformative relational possibilities.
Key Words: dialogic self-construction, identity, phenomenology, self and
social context, social constructionism
Freedom and transformation have a special status in constructionist psychol-
ogy as central criteria for evaluating theories. Based on such approaches as
anti-foundationalist philosophy (e.g. Feyerabend, 1976; Kuhn, 1962), the
sociology of knowledge (e.g. Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Mannheim, 1936)
and critical theory (e.g. Habermas, 1987; Horkheimer, 1968/1992; Horkhei-
mer & Adorno, 1944/1997), constructionist psychology denies the empiricist
notion that theories can correspond to reality. There is no way to put all
events in the ‘real world’ on one side and all our representations on the other
and then see how they match up (Gergen & Kaye, 1992).
As the analysis of discourse replaces the analysis of how discourse
represents the world, constructionists need alternative criteria for evaluating
theories. Some reject all traditional criteria for evaluating theory to embrace
an ‘attitude of tolerant indifference’ or a ‘happy nihilism’ (Kvale, 1992).
Most constructionists, however, ‘find certain moral demands embedded in
the very nature of discourse’ (Danziger, 1997, p. 409). One such moral
demand on a theorist is to facilitate conditions that grant people the greatest
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possible freedom for transformation by constructing themselves through
social relations (Gergen, 2001a, 2001b).
Constructionist psychology has facilitated this kind of freedom by, for
instance, challenging traditional conceptions of the self—by making it
possible for people to interpret the self not in terms of essences, as a
bounded entity with fixed attributes, but as a dialogic process (e.g. Hermans
& Kempen, 1993; Wortham, 2001b). According to Bakhtin, whose work has
been an important inspiration to many constructionists, ‘dialogic’ means
both that individuals only exist through their relations with others and that
these constitutive relations are characterized by ‘unfinalizedness, open-
endedness and indeterminacy’ (Bakhtin, 1929/1973, p. 43). Constructionists
do not prefer such a dialogic account of the self because it is more accurate.
Rather, they reject an essentialist account of the self because of its implicit
claim that essences represent the sole truth of what it means to be an
individual and because this claim limits people’s perceptions of what is
possible for them.
This paper argues that many types of constructionism unwittingly contra-
dict themselves, in their accounts of social construction and their emphasis
on freedom and transformation as criteria for evaluating theories. Put
simply, we argue that self-construction, if it is a matter of building up
identifications and habitual enactments, drastically limits the possibilities for
self-transformation. To make this argument, we first discuss different
conceptions of dialogic self-construction in the current literature. Following
the practice of Gergen (1985) and Stam (1990), we use ‘constructionist’ as
an umbrella term for similar approaches. Different conceptions of dialogic
self-construction entail different theories of how individuals relate to others
and encompass different possibilities for freedom and transformation. We
evaluate current conceptions of dialogic self-construction in terms of their
implications for freedom and transformation, and we compare the sorts of
freedom and transformation that are invited by current conceptions to an
alternative conception that we believe has more beneficial consequences.
Overview of Argument
The constructionist theories we review agree that the following are im-
portant aspects of dialogic self-construction (cf. Davies & Harre´, 1990):
1. Self-interpretations are texts, which means that they consist of socially
learned and recognizable categories and story-lines. These texts make our
lived experience accessible to us.
2. An individual identifies with—that is, defines the self in terms of—
specific types of categories and story-lines.
3. The individual repeatedly makes these self-defining categories salient
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with respect to the self, either by consciously circulating them or by
embodying them through tastes or bodily techniques.
4. Consequently, social relations organize in repetitive ways around the
categories that the focal individual makes salient.
We argue that, when people adopt this type of dialogic self-construction,
they attend relatively more to the abstract discourses that each participant
supplies to a situation and relatively less to the unique dynamics of the
currently ongoing interaction. It is because of this neglect of unique
situational dynamics that relations organize repetitively around the socially
recognizable meanings supplied by each participant. We argue that people’s
identification with a particular construction of the self stands in the way of
those situated processes that might otherwise let meaning emerge from the
unique dynamics of the joint situation.
We are not arguing that current constructionist conceptions are wrong,
however. To the contrary, we believe that they accurately portray how
people often identify with categories or discourses and use these to position
and construct themselves repeatedly in various contexts. But we are arguing
that many of these current conceptions are incomplete because they do not
sufficiently attend to the more direct ways in which people can relate to
others and to situations. By ‘direct’ we mean that such relations need not be
mediated by the self-defining texts that participants supply to the situation.
We believe that the current constructionist conception of dialogic self-
construction is really a theory of a particular, albeit ubiquitous, type of social
behavior.
Specifically, we draw from our empirical work and our reading of the
phenomenological literature (e.g. Dreyfus, 1999; Heidegger, 1962) to illus-
trate how individuals can identify not only with ‘texts’ (imagined and
enacted categories for the self) but also with their lived experience. This
alternative kind of self-interpretation identifies the individual with currently
ongoing activity. We do not mean to imply that people who adopt this
different kind of self-interpretation do not use texts to understand the self,
but only that in this more direct mode people place a primacy on lived
experience (instead of on particular types of text) and then search for
appropriate texts. We label this alternative type of dialogic self-construction
direct involvement, as compared to the identity-induced involvement de-
scribed in most constructionist literature. Because individuals in direct
involvement primarily orient towards the unique dynamics of the activity
(instead of towards their abstract understanding of this activity or towards
the activity’s self-relevant implications), their behavior is organized rela-
tively more by unique situational dynamics. One implication of our argu-
ment is that repetition and the need for its overcoming (i.e. transformation)
are artifacts of a particular way of interpreting the self, which are inad-
vertently facilitated by the assumptions of current constructionist theories.
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According to constructionism’s own pragmatic criteria for evaluating
theories (Gergen, 2001a, p. 420), a more direct conception of dialogic self-
construction is preferable to current conceptions because of the expanded
possibilities for relation, freedom and transformation that it offers to people
who adopt it. We also argue that our conception of dialogic self-construction
is more kindred in spirit to Bakhtin’s work, which has served as one
important foundation to many current conceptions.
Current Constructionist Conceptions of Dialogic Self-
construction
Constructionists argue that, in theory, individuals are free to engage a wide
range of social resources in each situation. In practice, however, each
individual uses only a narrow range of what is socially available. Individuals
tend to repeat certain patterns of discourse and behavior across diverse
situations. Constructionists generally explain such repetition in terms of
‘taken-for-grantedness’: individuals mistake social or personal theories and
conventions for facts. People do not explore and make use of other available
interpretive or behavioral options than those implied by the convention or
habit they follow. Many constructionists want to expose this taken-for-
grantedness in ‘sciences and in daily life’ (Gergen, 1985, p. 267), thus
freeing individuals from the constraints of their habits (Gergen & Kaye,
1992). This section offers a critical review of how two different types of
constructionist approaches explain repetition and its overcoming. We focus
on how these different explanations of repetition and overcoming follow
from the theories’ different conceptions of dialogic self-construction.
Dialogic Self-construction
Constructionist theories conceive of dialogic self-construction in terms of
specific texts or narratives that individuals perform repeatedly in their social
interactions (e.g. White & Epston, 1990). These texts refer to imagined or
enacted categories and story-lines that a person makes salient with respect to
the self and that acquire meaning either through local, interactive (e.g.
Davies & Harre´, 1990; Wortham, 2001a, 2001b) or through more macro-
structural social processes (e.g. Bourdieu, 1975/1984; Butler, 1990). Some
authors (e.g. Freeman, 1993, 1995; McAdams, 1997; Schafer, 1992; White
& Epston, 1990) use the term ‘text’ to describe a way for individuals to
access the world that is related to but distinct from lived experience. Lived
experience comprises an individual’s impressions of the world in a largely
‘inchoate’ form (E. Bruner, as cited in White & Epston, 1990, p. 12). Texts
are ways of making sense of our experience by assigning social categories
and story-lines to some of these impressions.
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The narrative form of organizing experience implies a selection from and
synthesis of life experience (McAdams, 1997, pp. 56–57). This unification
yields a dominant story, a plot into which current events and people fit as
chapters or characters (cf. Davies & Harre´, 1990, p. 48). People can have
more than one story. Nor must each story be internally consistent or
compatible with other stories (Davies & Harre´, 1990). Nonetheless, the
stories in play at any moment organize an individual’s experience of a given
situation by positioning the self and others based on the focal individual’s
personal experience, as this experience is encapsulated in a story.
From the focal individual’s perspective, a dominant story is that aspect of
an individual’s experience with which the individual has identified, which
means appropriated as ‘one’s own’ (McAdams, 1997, p. 56).
The fact that it is mine—that when I see the sunset, I am seeing it; that
when you hurt my feelings, those were my feelings, not yours, that were
hurt—provides a unity to selfhood without which human life in society as
we know it simply would not exist. (McAdams, 1997, p. 57)
Because of this identification, the person tries to understand current events
with reference to categories that he or she brings from prior experience,
which are used to construe the current situation. The sense of a temporally
continuous self (White & Epston, 1990, p. 10) is partly an artifact of a self-
narrative’s unifying properties—as we repeatedly think of and enact partic-
ular categories for ourselves, we get a sense of coherence as that particular
type of self.
The categories of self acquire a special meaning and importance to the
focal individual. Individuals have an emotional commitment to the subject
position implied in their dominant story (Davies & Harre´, 1990). An
emotional commitment often implies a positive evaluation of the category
the person identifies with (e.g. warm-hearted), a negative evaluation of the
opposite category (e.g. cold-hearted), and a perceived irrelevance of alter-
native classifications of the same phenomenon (e.g. extroverted/introverted,
overbearing/reserved, weak/principled). We argue that the commitments
people feel towards the classification system they identify with cause them
to supply this system to a situation, independent of whether it is relevant
(one aspect of Freud’s [1900/1965] concept of ‘transference’ that continues
to be useful—although we would not want to borrow all of Freud’s
metapsychology). These commitments reduce the flexibility or the multi-
plicity of perspectives with which people can access diverse situations.
Dominant stories or texts of the self are dialogic, not found in individuals.
The self constituted through such stories or categories is not ‘an entity found
in nature . . . but [is] told through dialogue, in words, images, and enact-
ments’ (Schafer, 1992, p. xvi).
The notion of a ‘story’ or ‘narrative’ assumes the existence of a person who
tells and an actual or imagined person who listens. The fact that the
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listener, another person, is always implied makes the self a dialogic
phenomenon par excellence. (Hermans & Kempen, 1993, p. xx)
Because the stories and categories used to construct the self are always
already embedded in dialogue, relations between people are ‘to be con-
sidered as the interaction of readers around particular texts’ (White &
Epston, 1990, p. 9). These texts consist of the categories that each partici-
pant makes salient with respect to the self by performing a particular type of
story. The salient categories, in turn, organize interactions because they
invoke (i.e. activate and make ready for use) socially recognizable meaning
that informs the behavior of the other participants towards the focal person
(White & Epston, 1990). The self thus consists of a story about the focal
person that is modified through real or imagined social interaction.
In summary, dominant stories are ways of mediating ongoing experience
from the point of view of the subject. Based on his or her dominant stories,
the individual (1) selects from current impressions those that are significant
to the self and (2) interprets these impressions based on those aspects of the
individual’s experience that are encapsulated in the relevant story. Relational
dynamics also contribute to the repetitive nature of the focal person’s
experience because the person is treated in a similar way by different people
across different situations, as these others respond to the socially recogniz-
able categories the focal person makes salient.
Repetition and Its Overcoming
From a constructionist perspective, then, being a self means that certain
categories and story-lines are repeatedly made salient with respect to the
focal individual. Diverse constructionist theories disagree both about
the types of processes that cause this repetition and about whether repetition
is undesirable from the point of view of the focal individual. These
differences are relevant because they imply different possibilities for free-
dom and transformation. The authors cited so far tend to emphasize the role
of discursive or interactive processes in generating and sustaining particular
types of selves. Other authors emphasize the role of macro-structural
processes (e.g. Butler, 1990). While some of the authors reviewed so far also
address power (e.g. White & Epston, 1990), most of them treat power as an
effect of discourse (cf. Danziger, 1997). In contrast, authors with a more
macro-structural orientation generally believe that people cannot use dis-
course to refuse the kinds of selves that are socially imposed on them
because these selves are the results of ‘rigid power structures established in
the past and protected from change by countless institutionalized practices
and textual conventions’ (Danziger, 1997, p. 410).
Discursively oriented and macro-structural theories differ in their evalua-
tion of repetition. For the discursively oriented theories, it is not a problem
THEORY & PSYCHOLOGY 12(5)630
that people’s experiences are repetitively organized around dominant stories.
The repetition induced by dominant stories is only a problem if the focal
person decides that the content of the particular dominant story is ‘unhelpful,
unsatisfying, and dead-ended’ (White & Epston, 1990, p. 14). In such a case,
if such a person can see beyond the ‘taken-for-grantedness’ of habitual
stories, he or she has the freedom to author a ‘new, liberating narrative’
(White & Epston, 1990, p. x). According to some constructionists (e.g.
Freeman, 1993; Schafer, 1992; White & Epston, 1990), people often author
these new narratives outside of their daily interactions, for example in a
therapeutic context or in private reflection. They then circulate and modify
these stories during their daily interactions. In this view, the ability to author
one’s dominant story according to attributes one finds desirable represents
an important type of freedom.
Macro-structural approaches tend to judge the repetitive patterns that
constitute the self as a problem per se, that is, independently of whether this
repetition seems desirable to the person who performs it. Repetition is a
problem for such approaches because they view it as a symptom of coercive
structural influences. Authors in the macro-structural tradition emphasize
how socially recognizable selves are expressed not only through
situationally-variable categories but also through categories with which the
individual is endowed as a result of social position. These categories
systematically and subtly influence people’s perception and self-expression
in the form of tastes, dress and bodily techniques (e.g. Bourdieu,
1975/1984). In addition, because these tastes and techniques are visible to
other members of a society and have socially recognizable meaning, others
will organize their behavior around these cues.
As a result of this different account of repetition and its causes, the macro-
structural approach has a different conception about what kinds of freedom
and transformation are possible. On this view, repetition is not the result of
a person’s authoring of a dominant story. Rather, it is the expression
of typical selves that are socially imposed on people as a result of their
membership in various groups. Because people are not free to re-author
themselves as the discursively oriented constructionists say, freedom con-
sists of recognizing social constraint and operating skillfully within it.
People can certainly change some of their salient categories, such as tastes,
dress, bodily techniques, or even the appearance of age and gender.
However, this does not imply that people are now free from socially
imposed meaning. It merely means that now a different type of social
meaning will be imposed on the person. Operating skillfully within these
constraints means that people can ‘regulate the process of repetition’ (Butler,
1990) by introducing variations on social types of selves—thus Butler’s
account of people altering how gender-related meaning is applied to them by
subverting the social meaning through parody.
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An Alternative Conception of a Dialogic Self
Both discursive and structural accounts of dialogic self-construction assume
that the self gets built up through the repetition of categories or story-lines
that the person comes to identify with. Transformation occurs when a person
changes or parodies habitual categories. In contrast, we argue that repetition
and taken-for-grantedness can be avoided when people avoid identification.
Although most of us do impose habitual categories of the self on new
situations, people can sometimes involve themselves more directly. Instead
of building up the self through accretions of cultural categories, we can open
ourselves to categories that emerge in particular situations.
Gergen and Kaye (1992) have also argued that dominant stories can get in
the way of people’s attention to situational dynamics. They suggest that
people will be more mindful to what is appropriate in a given situation when
they understand the socially constructed nature of the world. We interpret
this statement as suggesting that some kind of additional, skeptical under-
standing can facilitate participation in an ongoing situation. In contrast, our
argument is based on the logic of subtracting situation-extrinsic elements.
People can respond to the elements in a situation without invoking such
additional understandings.
One might argue that this is another way of saying that people achieve a
tacit understanding that there are no general truths, as Gergen and Kaye
(1992) suggested. We agree. But in our argument, this understanding is not
a generalized, intellectually achieved one but a derived one that, in each
situation, emerges spontaneously under the condition that people do not
identify with pre-given categories. In the presence of identification, for
example with the understanding that we cannot know anything for sure,
people will bring this understanding to the situation as a general concept that
will distract their attention from more concrete, situational cues. Something
other than a general insight into hermeneutics is needed to liberate people
from taken-for-grantedness. We propose that this something is the absence
of identification.
Texts and Lived Experience
As noted above, many constructionists distinguish between an individual’s
lived experience and the texts by which people turn their lived experience
into a narrative. We argue that the type of ongoing relationship that
the theories implicitly posit between lived experience and texts limits the
theories’ conception of freedom and transformation. This section first
compares the constructionist approach to our alternative and then discusses
the other factor that determines and limits the constructionists’ conception of
freedom and transformation: identification.
THEORY & PSYCHOLOGY 12(5)632
Some argue that many of the impressions that constitute our lived
experience are not accessible to us unless they take a narrative form (e.g.
White & Epston, 1990). For example, White and Epston (1990) describe the
dominant story of one subject, ‘Katherine’, who believed that her chronic
back pain had ‘isolated her from contact with strangers’. The therapists
explain how they
. . . asked Katherine if she could recall a time when she could have let the
pain prevent her from having personal contact with another person but
refused to submit to its demands. After a search that lasted for about 20
minutes, Katherine remembered an incident that had occurred three years
earlier. She had been for a short walk and, not far from home, had noticed
a stranger approaching from the opposite direction. The stranger looked
friendly, and Katherine thought that he might greet her. As he drew level,
she nodded and said ‘hello’ as he passed. Although this was a feat that she
could not have predicted in advance, she did not attach any significance to
it at the time. (p. 57, emphasis added)
Consistent with constructionist theories, this quote illustrates a relatively
impermeable relation between a person’s dominant story and lived experi-
ence. However, this impermeable relationship partly occurs because domi-
nant stories get in the way of people’s ability to benefit from their lived
experience. Even though Katherine had been exhibiting behaviors that
contradicted her dominant story, she did not notice these behaviors because
they were not ‘predicted’ by the story.
This account implies a primacy of texts over lived experience. People first
need to activate a particular text or category, and then they have access to
the impressions that fall under this particular category. Once these im-
pressions about the self are accessible, they are available for organizing
one’s future behavior more consciously. This process of constructing the
future based on one’s personal past creates a temporally continuous self—he
sense of being a particular kind of person. Because the self is the only object
that is monitored continuously in this way, it acquires a special significance
to the person monitoring it (cf. Higgins, 1997). Because of this special
significance, the concerns relevant to this self (as opposed to the demands of
the current situation) generally organize people’s decisions.
In contrast, we argue that people can act spontaneously on the constraints
of a situation when their identification—and the resulting preoccupation
with an abstract sense of self—is cleared away. In such instances, situations
organize themselves. The construct of individual agency is not necessary to
explain situational dynamics, because the relevant categories emerge from
people’s interaction in the situation. Such an account places a primacy on
lived experience over text. In our approach, lived experience refers to
perceptions of the currently ongoing activity. These perceptions are not
personal, but are generally available to all participants in the situation. Note
that we are not proposing unmediated access to situations or ‘text-less’
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enactments of the self. All experience is mediated and all selves are storied.
We claim, however, that the mediating categories only sometimes come
from people’s habitual stock—that they can also emerge by clearing away
habitual selves and participating more directly in lived experience.
When undesirable dominant stories control people’s perceptions, White
and Epston (1990) try to help them recover desirable types of lived
experience as the first step toward transformation. As illustrated in the above
quote, the therapists encourage people to search their lived experience for
situations that contradict undesirable assumptions in their dominant story.
Once people become aware of this contradictory evidence, they can let go of
undesirable categories (e.g. being fearful in social situations) and adopt more
desirable ones (e.g. being socially courageous).
On this approach, transformation involves changing the content of one’s
dominant story to a more desirable one. In Katherine’s example, she was
already displaying courageous behaviors but simply was not aware of them
because the categories she identified with blocked these types of perceptions.
Hence, the transformation is primarily in the story that she used to screen her
lived experience. We argue that such a theory limits the kind of transforma-
tion that is possible for a person who adopts this theory. Because the theory
is only concerned with those repetitions the client experiences as undesir-
able, the transformation process focuses on finding evidence in lived
experience that contradicts the undesirable story. Thus the structure of the
old story guides and constrains the client’s perception of lived experience
and also implicitly constrains the structure of the new story.
As one would expect, then, the new stories in White and Epston’s (1990)
examples tend to revolve around the same dichotomous categories as the old
story (e.g. fearful–courageous, miserable–happy)—only the clients now
identify with the more ‘desirable’ aspect of the category. Clients’ percep-
tions and social relations are also likely to be organized by the same type of
plot, at the expense of a person’s ability to experience other types of plots. It
seems that what in this particular account appears as a person’s freedom or
authorship in fact represents the continuing influence of the person’s
problematic habits. This ‘solution’ to people’s difficulties in fact perpetuates
them. A more desirable freedom, in our view, would consist of the freedom
from the compulsion to invoke any particular category, including both
‘desirable’ and ‘undesirable’ aspects.
We suggest that many personal difficulties have nothing to do with the
particular content of a person’s story. One type of content is not inherently
better than another. Rather, these difficulties have to do with an inadequate
relation between discourse and lived experience. This inadequate relation
comes about because people’s preoccupation with the categories that are
relevant to their dominant story prevents them from responding appro-
priately to what is relevant to a situation. Thus behavior that is motivated by
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the categories a person identifies with is likely to stand out and cause
problems.
This reasoning also has implications for a macro-structural account. When
people act based on identity-induced, situationally inappropriate categories,
others’ participation often organizes around the socially recognizable mean-
ing of these ‘odd’ behaviors. For example, Kanter (1977) argued that
because women are often underrepresented in work groups, their gender
attracts attention and organizes the behavior of all participants in
stereotypical ways. However, two more recent studies show that this process
did not take place when women performed their task well (Bradley, 1980) and
when they avoided self-serving performance attributions (Taps & Martin,
1990). These studies suggest that categories relevant to a given situation, such
as competence, can override the salience of situation-extrinsic categories,
unless the focal individual supplies such situation-extrinsic categories to a
situation: for example, by using them as explanations for treatment the person
perceives as unfair. This is not to say that stereotyping and discrimination do
not exist or that the victims invariably inflict such injustices on themselves.
We are merely arguing that situational factors can sometimes influence
whether and how social categories are applied, and that the possibilities for
this influence are currently poorly understood. We believe that non-
identification represents an important aspect of such influence.
Our argument is also consistent with clinical evidence. According to a
constructionist account, discourse helps and, indeed, is required for a person
to access lived experience. But if discursive resources represented such
valuable tools for coping, why would people often have an extensive verbal
and behavioral repertoire in exactly those domains that also house their
difficulties? One possible answer is that our discursive resources proliferate
around our ineptness. For example, scholars have argued that mental content
about an activity primarily arises when people’s participation somehow fails
(e.g. Heidegger, 1962; Wicklund, 1986). In such instances, people develop
vocabulary that helps them understand the potential sources of this failure.
Despite—or, as we suggest, precisely because of—these abundant discursive
resources, people often do not benefit from the lived experience they
supposedly encode.
Dominant stories are likely to arise around those situations in which
people are incapable of participating effectively. Moreover, once these
stories are in place, they distract the participants’ attention from the unique
dynamics of the situation and towards socially recognizable categories that
then organize behavior in stereotypical ways. People’s problems, then, may
be caused not by the unfavorable content of their dominant story, but by the
indiscriminate application of such stories to an ongoing situation—n a way
that prevents people’s effective participation. What is needed is not a theory
of discourse but a theory of effective participation in a situation.
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Identification and Participation
The constructionist theory of dialogic self-construction describes the mu-
tually constitutive relationship between people and their social context.
According to the theory, people consist of commitments to particular types
of texts with social origin. An individual’s participation in each social
interaction is influenced by the particular type of text the individual
identifies with. This means that the person experiences the interaction from
the position of the subject, which involves
. . . recognition of oneself as having the characteristics that locate oneself
as a member of various subclasses of dichotomous categories and not of
others—i.e. the development of oneself as belonging in the world in certain
ways and thus seeing the world from the perspective of one so positioned.
This recognition entails an emotional commitment to the category member-
ship and the development of a moral system organized around the
belonging. (Davies & Harre´, 1990, p. 47)
We agree that individuals invariably make use of social resources,
especially language. But people can use these resources in different ways,
with distinct implications for how to conceive of the dialogic relationship
between people and the social context. We propose that identification and
subjective positioning is only one possible way in which people can
participate in social interactions. It is only under this condition that people
circulate the social and idiosyncratic categories they are committed to in a
situation. Because situations organize around the socially recognizable
meaning of the categories that the various participants supply to a situation,
the generative role of dialogue in the situation is relatively limited—as
compared to what might be possible in direct involvement.
The theory of direct involvement proposes that individuals can experience
themselves in terms of the ongoing activity, instead of in terms of pre-
determined categories that define the individual. We will illustrate how, in
such instances, people in an interaction form a system that is unified in its
effect on the ongoing activity. This requires that participants perceive one
another in terms of potential contributions rather than subject positions.
Potential contributions differ from subject positions in that they refer to
people only in situationally relevant terms—they refer to concrete behaviors
instead of typical perspectives, and they assume a shared interest in
advancing the current situation instead of jockeying for status or other
resources.
Direct involvement does not mean that people do not think of themselves
and others in terms of socially recognizable categories, but merely that they
use situationally oriented types of perceptions. This is possible because in
direct involvement people relate differently to social categories. In direct
involvement a person may well recognize the self and another as ‘a member
of various subclasses of dichotomous categories’ (Davies & Harre´, 1990,
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p. 47), but the person is likely to view these categories merely as descriptive
as opposed to self-defining or self-identifying. Categories that we view as
self-descriptive are not associated with the special significance that we feel
for self-identifying categories. Consequently, self-description does not in-
voke the kinds of emotional commitments that compel people to supply
social or idiosyncratic categories to a situation. People are then relatively
freer to respond to the unique dynamics of a situation, which, we argue,
affords for a more expanded sense of a dialogic relation.
The absence of emotional commitment in direct involvement does not
imply the absence of emotions or imply that direct involvement is a form of
detachment. Emotions in direct involvement are generated by the structure
of the situation itself, instead of by the implications of this situation for the
self. For example:
You begin to write a poem. Before long it, the poem, begins to develop
metrical, stanzaic, symbolical requirements. You, as the writer of the poem,
are serving it – it seems. . . . It is at this point that we get our creative
second wind, at the point when the object takes over. . . . As one friend, a
novelist and critic, put it, ‘If it doesn’t take over and you are foolish
enough to go on, what you end up with is contrived and alien.’ (Bruner,
1962, pp. 25–6)
Bruner here describes how effective writing comes about when the writer
and the poem form one system, in the sense that each of these two elements
continuously responds to the other and yields a unified effect. During this
process of direct involvement, emotions (e.g. the energizing feeling of
getting a ‘creative second wind’) are not the faculties of an individual but an
aspect of this ongoing communication process. Emotions in direct involve-
ment are a form of perception that connects a person to the ongoing situation
and, therefore, contributes to the person’s effective participation in the
situation. Because direct involvement makes people more sensitive to
the situation, it is not a form of detachment. Instead, it is the abstract attitude
of identity-induced involvement, of which emotional commitment is an
integral part, that detaches the individual from the situation.
We argue that people will exhibit repetition and taken-for-grantedness
only under the condition of identification. Our theory is consistent with the
etymology of the term ‘identification’. The term ‘identity’ comes from the
Latin source ident (idem), which means ‘repeatedly, again and again,
earlier’. According to Webster’s (1996), identity is currently used to
describe ‘the state or fact of remaining the same one or ones under varying
aspects or conditions’. Identity is synonymous with repetition and stability.
The modern (but not the early) usage implies that this stability of the entity
across conditions is desirable, or at least natural, by suggesting that
deviations from such stability can be signs of mental illness. For example,
Webster’s states that identity is integral to a person’s ‘sense of self,
providing sameness and continuity in personality over time and sometimes
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disturbed in mental illness, as schizophrenia’. The early Latin usage con-
ceives of identity as an achievement in the sense that it is the outcome of
repeated activity. In contrast, the modern usage views identity as a state.
This etymology suggests that we have over time come to misperceive
identity as a natural state, as opposed to one possible way of relating to a
situation. Because we do not compare identity-induced involvement to
alternative ways of relating to a situation, we do not understand the
mechanism by which identification creates the repetition that we consider a
more or less undesirable part of human experience. Notice how the modern
definition distinguishes explicitly between a person and the situation and
attributes stability to the person. In contrast, we are arguing against
distinguishing the person and the situation, maintaining that the stability
supplied by the individual closes off relational possibilities and impedes
transformation.
Direct involvement implies a different conception of freedom, as com-
pared to current constructionist theories. Both discursive and macro-
structural accounts equate freedom with a person’s ‘agency’ (Butler, 1990)
to either author and re-author or vary scripts. This definition of freedom is
consistent with our colloquial understanding of freedom as independence
from constraint or the exercising of individual choice. The referent of this
freedom is the biological individual. In contrast, in our account, freedom
comes about when participants in a situation relinquish the compulsion to
supply particular types of texts to the situation. In contrast to the traditional
conception of freedom, freedom here involves a maximum responsiveness to
the constraints of situated dynamics, such as the concrete ‘metrical, stanzaic,
symbolical’ requirements of the poem in Bruner’s quote above. The referent
of this freedom is the activity that unfolds according to its situated dynamics
(e.g. the writing of the poem) rather than according to the abstract categories
supplied by individual participants. The following section illustrates the
concept of ‘direct involvement’, with examples from our ongoing empirical
work.
Examples and Discussion
Background
Our examples are drawn from a 12-month ethnography in the US office of a
German software company, ‘Velvet’. The ethnography examined the distinct
consequences of identity-induced and direct involvement for joint cognitive
accomplishments. The examples analyze the interactions that took place
during a conference call that Velvet’s German top management, including
Michael (CEO), organized to discuss a coordination failure between the US
and the French team. The US team, consisting of one sales person (Jeffer-
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son) and two systems engineers (Dieter and Lothar), had met with Jake, the
US Chief Technology Officer of the French advertising agency ‘Panache’, to
discuss the initial work the team had completed for an international roll-out
of Velvet’s product within Panache. During this meeting, the team called
Jake’s boss, Serge, in France for a clarification question. To their surprise,
they found out that Serge was meeting with the French Velvet team and an
independent contractor, Loui, to also discuss an international roll-out of
Velvet’s product within Panache. At that point, the US and the French team
compared their ideas in front of the two Panache executives. After the
meeting, the French sales person, Jean-Claude, left an e-mail for Velvet’s
top management. He reported that Serge and Loui thought that the US
presentation was ‘bullshit’ and that the US team was ‘a bunch of clowns’.
We illustrate the construct of direct involvement with the behavior of
Dieter and Lothar, two systems engineers who participated in the conference
call from their office together with Alexandra Michel, who listened while
taking notes and taping the conversation. Our baseline analysis of Dieter
shows that, in general, he had difficulty managing his anger, which pre-
dictably flared up when he felt that his contributions or his competence was
undervalued. This anger then caused him to act solely on what was bothering
him personally, regardless of whether his responses were appropriate to the
joint situation. The focal conference call was the first situation we witnessed
in which Dieter resisted the temptation to respond to attacks on his
competence and, instead, kept prioritizing the currently ongoing situation.
The attacks on Dieter’s competence in this context were direct and severe—
including Jean-Claude’s remarks that Dieter’s and Lothar’s product was
‘bullshit’ and ‘ridiculous’, and his report that Loui and the client called them
a ‘bunch of clowns’. But Dieter nonetheless did not respond by reacting
from his typical (identity-induced) pattern of anger. In what follows we
explore what his direct involvement looked like.
A Different Kind of Dialogic Self
According to our framework, attaining direct involvement is a matter of
overcoming identification. We draw on Bakhtin’s theory of the novel in
order to clarify what we mean by identification and its absence. Bakhtin
(1935/1981) distinguishes between two perspectives in a novel, the per-
spective of the characters and that of the novelist. The defining attribute of
the characters is that they speak from a particular ‘belief system’ (p. 313) or
subject position that they represent—or with which they are identical.
Characters can speak with more than one voice, but they are nonetheless
‘trapped’ in one or more subject positions. The novelist, in contrast, makes
liberal use of the privilege to enter and leave any of the characters’ subject
positions. Hence, one important attribute of Bakhtin’s novelist (in a highly
developed or polyphonic novel) is the absence of identification with any
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particular subject position, which implies freedom from the compulsion to
construe the world from one perspective only.
The following quote from the focal conference call illustrates this absence
of identification in how Dieter related to the other participants.
Michael: Was Jake happy [after Friday’s meeting], Dieter?
Dieter: Well, after the meeting, Jake seemed happy. And it seemed that we came to a
decision. But I am not sure about this anymore. . . . Because my problem is to
understand Jake’s role. And whether Jake or Serge has the last instance in this
decision. And I am not sure what Serge’s opinion is. Whether he is still fully behind
this. It sounded to us like he was. But . . .
Jefferson: Dieter, did you have a chance to read the e-mail message that we traded last night
with Jake about this?
Dieter: Right, last night, Jake responded to an e-mail that he talked to Serge. And that he
had the feeling that he’s still behind all the decisions. He said that unless Serge is a
good actor he seems to be fine with what we decided on Friday.
Our analyses of identity-induced involvement showed that—like a character
in a novel—people in this mode of relating identified with a particular
subject position that had a special significance to them and from which they
then construed situations (cf. also Davies & Harre´, 1990, p. 47). In contrast,
Dieter, in the above quote, did not present himself in terms of a unified,
personal perspective that he identified with and prioritized. Consistent with
how Bakhtin (1935/1981, pp. 311ff.) characterizes the language of the
novelist, Dieter speaks from various positions in this segment, positions that
engage in a dialogue with each other.
For example, in the above quote, Dieter did not respond to Michael’s
question with a personal opinion, but disclosed an ‘on-line’ reasoning
process in the form of a conversation between a variety of relevant
perspectives. In this reasoning process, the qualified use of Michael’s words
(‘seemed happy’) served as a question that Dieter posed himself from
Michael’s perspective. Dieter then considered this question by occupying
those relevant perspectives he had access to, including Dieter’s initial
perspective (‘after the meeting’), Dieter’s current perspective (‘But I am not
sure about this anymore’) and Dieter-speaking-as-Jake’s perspective.
Notice that Dieter not only made reference to Michael’s and Jake’s
perspectives but also spoke as Michael and Jake by using their words as his
own words. This is relevant as evidence that Dieter interpreted himself not in
terms of an abstract self-concept (‘I am’) but in terms of the activity
(‘doing’) that he was involved in, for which he served as a resource. Instead
of behaving with reference to his own abstract self-concept, he adopted
various positions that could help with the task. From the perspective of the
task, the relevance and utility of the resources matters but not the identity of
the individual who contributed them. When Dieter used the voices of others
as his own, he maintained the integrity of the perspective by repeating the
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exact words (i.e. the informational or resource part), but he did not identify
with any perspective—including his own.
In direct involvement, as for Dieter in this example, the embodiment of a
perspective did not entail identification with the perspective. Our reading of
Bakhtin suggests that identification is about the kind of relationship that an
individual has with a perspective. In particular, identification is characterized
by a compulsion that consists of uncontrollable (often unwitting) attachment
to the perspective and taken-for-grantedness or automaticity. Automaticity
means that people invoke their habitual interpretations without necessarily
being aware of doing so and without being able to control this process (cf.
Bargh, 1989, 1996). We interpret Dieter’s frequent usage of qualifiers (e.g.
‘It sounded to us’, ‘But I am not sure about this anymore’) as evidence that
he exhibited a relative un-identified relationship to each of the perspectives
he was considering, in the sense that he had the freedom to retreat from
them. Moreover, in the quote above, Dieter treated all speaking perspectives,
including those that might be attributed to him, as equally significant. He did
not invoke an independent or privileged vantage point to consider per-
spectives designated as ‘other’, in distinction from ‘self’. Therefore, we
believe that Dieter’s qualifiers did not imply a distance or detachment from
a given perspective but extended an invitation for other speaking positions to
come in. Dieter’s qualifications marked each perspective as an incomplete
interpretation that would only be useful in combination with the other
perspectives.
Through this sort of multi-perspectival or dialogic conversation, lower-
level perspectives were transformed into a more comprehensive or higher-
level understanding. Note that, in contrast to how it happens in the context
of identity-induced involvement, the transformation of understanding in this
case does not describe the attributes or states of an individual but instead
describes the self-organizing processes of a situated system. The system is
free to self-organize when identity-induced obstacles, including automa-
ticity, are cleared away.
Implications for Participation
The construct of a dialogical self (e.g. Hermans & Kempen, 1993; Taylor,
1991) has been an important reaction against essentialist conceptions of the
self. However, constructionist conceptions of a dialogical self make an
unwanted assumption: Dialogue or relation is the exchange between distinct
and relatively autonomous subject positions. Therefore, these subject posi-
tions are the prerequisite for relations (e.g. Hermans & Kempen, 1993,
p. 148). In contrast, our framework conceives of relations as the connections
that tie people and other elements as mutually constitutive parts into a
situated system. Situated systems are defined by the task they accomplish
(e.g. writing a poem, dancing, carrying on a conversation). We argue that,
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when people conceive of their self in terms of subject positions, they tend to
neglect the currently ongoing situation. Subject positions impede rather than
promote relations. This section explains how the different kind of dialogic
self we are introducing facilitates relations with transformative potential.
In contrast to current constructionist practice, we study the dialogic self
not as a construction but as an interpretation. Self-construction refers to how
people construct the content of a particular subject position, typically in the
form of self-narratives or other accretions of categories and story-lines. Self-
interpretation has a more fundamental meaning. Following Dreyfus (1999),
we define self-interpretation as conspicuous action that reveals people’s
implicit sense of what it means to be a self and how selves relate to the
social context. In contrast to how self-construction is currently used, self-
interpretation need not involve discourse or narration. Through our study of
self-interpretations, we discovered how people can interpret the self not only
in terms of subject positions but also in terms of participating in a situated
system. In other words, self-interpretation is the process by which people
implicitly choose to conceive of themselves in terms of either a subject
position or a situational system. Sometimes people define themselves by
building up accretions of categories and story-lines, as the constructionists
would have it, but sometimes they define themselves by clearing away such
categories and involving themselves directly in situations.
We now explain how Bakhtin’s work helps us understand (1) how to
analyze people as situational systems, and (2) what the implications are for
transformation. Our perspective on relations takes seriously Bakhtin’s em-
phasis on the intense relationship that one consciousness can enter into with
another (1929/1973, p. 26). By supplying this adjective, Bakhtin suggests
that relations can be of variable quality. But relations in which one
consciousness joins another are invariably characterized by an intense or
heightened quality. According to our reading of Bakhtin, consciousness—
or heightened awareness, sensitivity and concern—is the attribute that
differentiates the novelist’s function from the subject position of the novel’s
characters. His construct of a novelist bears important similarities to our
construct of a dialogic self-interpretation. In contrast to a position (e.g. a
character position in the novel, a subject position), a function is defined not
as a free-standing entity or perspective but only in reference to what it
accomplishes for a system. In our framework, a function differs from a role,
in that a function refers to the needs of the situational system that constitutes
currently ongoing activity.
According to Bakhtin, the primary task of this situational system (i.e. the
novel) is productivity or the transformation of meaning. Note that trans-
formation, in this context, is a continuous system-level process, not an
episodic activity an individual undertakes to overcome repetition. Novelists
accomplish a distinctive sort of transformation, one fundamentally different
from the ‘complete single-personed hegemony’ (Bakhtin, 1935/1981, p. 297)
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over meaning that the poet exercises. Both the poet and the novelist provide
a unique perspective on words and forms by ‘immersing’ them in a complex
system. The poet, however, is this system, based on a deeply personal,
internal complexity. In contrast, the novelist can effectively participate in
and facilitate the transformational processes of a system precisely because
he or she clears away self-related complexity.
As Gergen (1989) points out, in traditional psychology and in everyday
life we have an extensive vocabulary for people’s ‘inner region’. This
vocabulary construes the inner region in terms of personal faculties, such as
motivations, cognition and emotion. Similar to how Bakhtin conceives of the
poet’s inner complexity, traditional psychology has focused on how these
faculties interact as parts of a personal system—that is, to serve the focal
individual’s interests. For example, according to one influential model (e.g.
Carver & Scheier, 1981, 1990; Higgins, 1998), people identify with partic-
ular goals (‘motivation’). Based on these personal goals, people’s cognitive
faculty scans the perceptual landscape for blips of meaning (Kelly,
1955/1963, p. 145). Emotions are an indication of how this meaning relates
to the personal goals (Higgins, 1996): anger indicates perceived short-
comings; satisfaction and triumph indicate that goals have been met and
exceeded. Just as the poet strips words and forms of their inherent meaning,
this personal system construes events in a currently existing situation based
on the person’s internal structure—not based on the situation’s structure. We
believe that these models accurately describe how people function in
identity-induced involvement. However, we currently lack adequate descrip-
tions of how people relate to the world in direct involvement, partly because
we lack a language for representing people as situational systems. The
following example contributes towards generating the requisite conceptual
tools.
In particular, the example is one attempt to represent individuals in terms
of the structures they provide to a situational system. We here illustrate how
emotion can work not as a personal faculty (i.e. as something that is located
within a person and that serves the person’s interests) but as a situated
process that serves the situational system. We do note mean to be essential-
ists about the existence of emotions here. We merely assert that people in
our cultural context act such structures into existence, and we study the
naturally occurring differences in such enactments. Our attempt differs from
similar projects in the constructionist literature. These other approaches
typically interpret emotions as performances (e.g. Averill, 1982, 1985;
Gergen, 1994), which means that emotions are not expressions of an inner
feeling state but requirements in a socially-structured ‘language game’
(Wittgenstein, 1953). Such approaches differ from ours in that they conceive
of these performances as oriented by extra-situational considerations, includ-
ing social norms and rules or the person’s own interests (e.g. Gergen,
1989).
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Towards a Situational Kind of Self
The following are extracts from our fieldnotes:
Jean-Claude said that the French client did not take the US team presenta-
tion seriously and in the end did not listen anymore. Lothar looks very
angry, gesturing to Dieter. Gestures look exaggerated, contrived. Does not
look like real anger. Dieter looks at Lothar, winks, and smiles in response
to Lothar’s gestures. The brief interaction with Lothar seemed to relax
him.
In conversation with Dieter, Jean-Claude said that Loui does not trust the
US team and wants to do most of the project by himself. Dieter said that
this would be a ‘major change for the US team’ to which the ‘US team has
to adjust’. Dieter speaks calmly. But Lothar gets even more excited. Red in
the face, slamming hand on the desk, seeking Dieter’s eye contact.
Exaggerated gestures. Dieter pats Lothar’s knee, smiles and says: ‘Why
don’t you get a glass of water or something.’
According to our analysis of typical behavior for these individuals, angry
behavior was unusual for Lothar—who was typically quiet and shy. We had
observed Lothar previously when the team’s work was publicly criticized. In
these situations, Lothar had not shown any visible reactions. In all of those
previous situations, however, Dieter had responded with uncontrollable
anger at hearing negative feedback on his own and his team’s work and
competence. Hence, in the above interactions, Lothar responded to cues that
Dieter typically could not help but respond to. Moreover, Lothar’s demeanor
mirrored Dieter’s habitual emotional reactions.
The fieldnotes depict Dieter’s responses as divided. On the one hand, his
attention was focused on listening and responding to Jean-Claude. On the
other hand, his emotions seemed yoked to Lothar’s emotions (as opposed to
Jean-Claude’s words). In identity-induced involvement, we had often ob-
served a process of emotional contagion (Barsade & Gibson, 1998) in which
a particular emotion spread across all participants without regard to the
common situation. For example, as people ‘caught’ anger from one another,
they responded to this anger and neglected the joint task. Emotional yoking
also involved the synchronization of emotion across co-present individuals.
However, the increase in one type of emotion in Lothar (anger, irritation)
caused an increase in an opposing type of emotion in Dieter (calm,
relaxation). The joint situation benefited because Dieter remained im-
pervious to stimuli that would have typically incited uncontrollable anger in
him, and because he could consequently contribute in a constructive manner
to the phone conversation.
We propose that Lothar and Dieter formed one situated emotional system.
In such a system, emotions are not located within a participant, signaling
how well the participant’s personal needs are being met. Rather, emotions
signal to the participants the requirements of the currently ongoing situation.
In particular, we suggest that Lothar, because he knew of Dieter’s sensitiv-
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ities to criticism, took the task of expressing Dieter’s anger upon himself,
without necessarily being aware of doing so. Thus the awkwardness of
Lothar’s anger display might indicate the unusual nature of this emotion for
him and his consequent lack of skill in displaying it. Lothar had repeatedly
mentioned that he cared about the project ‘being moved along’ and about the
participants ‘making progress’, which we interpret as situation-intrinsic
motivations. He knew that Dieter’s anger could impede progress because (1)
the feeling of anger made it impossible for Dieter to contribute his
knowledge, and (2) Dieter’s expressions of anger caused the other partici-
pants to respond in kind and to neglect the joint task. Hence, we believe that
one salient task involved containing Dieter’s anger and that Lothar contrib-
uted in this important manner to the joint situation.
By anticipating and displaying Dieter’s habitual emotions, Lothar ‘exter-
nalized’ this anger and afforded Dieter the opportunity to position himself
differently towards it. Dieter had previously identified with his anger in two
senses. First, consistent with how constructionists conceive of emotional
identification with a subject position (e.g. Davies & Harre´, 1990), he felt
angry when the personal goals he identified with were threatened by events
in a currently ongoing situation. Moreover, consistent with the notion of
automaticity, he had felt one with the anger—when anger arose in him, he
could only act on behalf of this anger. We believe that Lothar’s exaggerated
gestures communicated anger to Dieter, making it palpable for him. Dieter
responded by trying to calm Lothar down with sympathetic comments and
pats on the knee. These gestures indicate that Dieter was conscious of
Lothar’s perspective but did not identify with it—in the sense that the anger
did not take over Dieter’s experience and responses. There was no automa-
ticity. In other words, Dieter’s responses indicated that he remained in an
unattached or meta-position, acting on— rather than acting as—the anger
that was confronting him.
We have described here how emotion can be conceived of in situational as
opposed to individual-oriented terms. Our examples have shown how in
direct involvement, diverse perspectives and diverse events, such as the
emotions of anger and relaxation, organize themselves into one harmonious
effect on the situational system. This illustrates our belief that in direct
involvement the situation is the appropriate unit of analysis.
Conclusion
The constructionist conception of a dialogic self represents an important
reaction against essentialist conceptions of the self. As explained in the
introduction, constructionists react to essentialism not because the essential-
ist conception of the self is ‘inaccurate’ but because it impedes people’s
perception of possibilities for self-transformation. Associated with the
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pragmatic commitment to facilitating self-transformation is construction-
ism’s theoretical commitment to relational theory:
First, my contributions to the constructionist dialogues issue from what is
often viewed as a pragmatic standpoint. Essentially I write as a means of
entering into relationships out of which new forms of action may hopefully
emerge. . . . My chief goals are transformative. (Gergen, 2001a, p. 419)
This theoretical commitment involves a preference for construing the self
not in terms of psychological processes ‘that create a vision of society in
which individuals function as isolated, self-contained, and competitive
monads’, but as ‘inherently relational—inseparable from communal activity’
(Gergen, 2001b, p. 810; cf. Gergen, 1994). Our central argument is that the
current constructionist notion of a dialogic self unwittingly undermines
the very goals it was intended to promote.
From a pragmatic perspective, we have argued that when people adopt
this dialogic self concept in their lives, a building up of identifications and
habitual enactments results. In other words, this self concept unintentionally
contributes to the repetition and taken-for-grantedness that constructionists
have resolved to reveal and eliminate. The currently relatively narrow
conception of transformation, as an episodic activity that an individual
undertakes to overcome repetition, is an artifact of these identification-
induced processes. Also, because of the special significance that the accreted
identifications have for the focal individual, the person orients relatively
more towards these abstract self-constructions and relatively less towards the
unique aspects of the situation. As people’s involvement in their psycho-
logical situation ‘pads’ them from the currently ongoing activity, situational
relations fail to form and the unfolding of unique situational dynamics with
a more profound transformational potential is impeded. Thus, when people
adopt constructionism’s concept of a dialogic self, the vision that they
enact—that of community as consisting of ‘isolated monads’—is one that
constructionism wishes to counteract.
Nevertheless, we believe that constructionism’s practical and theoretical
goals can be accomplished through precisely the plan that the approach has
proposed: namely, expanding our conception of what it means to be a self
with attention to the comparative consequences that different self-
conceptions entail (Gergen, 2001a, p. 420). Our framework adds another
path to the one that has been charted. We suggest that this new entry on
constructionism’s map moves us closer towards the goals the program has
set for itself. In particular, we have shown that when people identify with the
currently ongoing activity (i.e. when they avoid identification with a subject
position), repetition and taken-for-grantedness are avoided as unique situa-
tional dynamics are free to unfold. We have drawn on our reading of
Bakhtin to illustrate an account of the self as a situated system that we
believe contributes a new—and we believe more genuinely relational—
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aspect to the constructionist approach. Our study of direct involvement also
differs from congenial constructionist approaches, such as positioning (Da-
vies & Harre´, 1990, p. 46), in that it introduces a third force that is
constitutive of meaning, beyond ‘discursive practices’ and personal ‘choice’.
This third force is situational emergence or self-organization.
The phenomenal experience of direct involvement and its relation to deft
behavior has, of course, been extensively documented (e.g. Csikszentmi-
h&aacute;lyi, 1990, 1993; Langer, 1989a, 1989b; Weick & Roberts, 1993;
Wicklund, 1986). However, although these theories have often pointed to
people’s enhanced sensitivity to the currently ongoing situation and to the
phenomenal experience of losing or ‘forgetting’ an abstract sense of self,
they have stopped short of making the situated system (as opposed to the
individual) their unit of analysis. We have argued, with constructionism, that
we must move beyond the individual. But we can nonetheless incorporate
into constructionism an important aspect of these above-noted approaches.
Applying the phenomenology of Heidegger (1962) and Dreyfus (1999), we
have framed the behaviors that these approaches describe as conspicuous
action from which a more relational type of self-interpretation can be
inferred; a self-interpretation that clears away the ‘monadic’ self and ‘sets
the world [i.e. the situational system] free’ (Heidegger, 1962).
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